What is one share of MSTR worth?
Same BTC stack on the books. Same dollar value at spot. But the answer depends on which question you're asking. Strategy's published BTC NAV per share is an asset-side ceiling — what one share would back if no claims existed. The conservative and PV-adjusted residuals deduct the senior preferred and debt claims explicitly, in two different ways. Three numbers below, three different questions, with the math made explicit.
Per-common-share value
Same inputs feed all three: 843,706 BTC at $65,676 = $55.4B BTC value. What differs is how each method values the preferred-stack obligation.
Total BTC value ÷ diluted-share count, with no deduction for senior claims. This is the asset-side ceiling: what each share would be worth if every dollar of BTC went to common, with no preferreds or debt standing in front. Useful as a benchmark vs the market price of MSTR — not a residual claim.
(BTC value − pref notional at $100/share − convertible debt) ÷ diluted shares. What a credit analyst computes assuming senior tranches get paid in full at worst-case par. Floor of the residual claim — Strategy never actually has to call the perpetuals, so this over-deducts.
Same as Method 2, but pref liability is the BTC-cost asymptote (~38% of par at CAGR=30%, weighted across the five series — 37% for the 10% quarterly prefs, 43% for STRC monthly) — what Strategy actually owes in BTC terms over infinite time, not the worst-case par. Lands between the floor and the ceiling: the most honest residual claim.
All three are illustrative. None is the “right” answer — they're three ways to ask the same question, with different assumptions about how to value the preferred-stack obligation. The spread between them is what's interesting.
Where each number comes from
| BTC holdings | 843,706 BTC |
|---|---|
| BTC spot price | $65,676 |
| BTC value at spot | $55.4B |
| Preferred notional total (par × shares) | $8.03B |
| Preferred PV(divs) total (at CAGR=30%) | $3.05B |
| Convertible debt outstanding (net of buybacks since Dec 31, 2025) | $6.70B |
| Diluted shares (common-equivalent — incl. options/RSUs + ITM converts + STRK if-converted; excl. STRF/STRD/STRC/STRE) | 382,756,000 |
Convertible debt total is manually curated from Strategy's most recent 10‑K — see SEC EDGAR ↗. Updated whenever a new 10‑K or 10‑Q lands. The $8.2B snapshot is shown net of $1.5B of convertible principal repurchased since then. Diluted-share count is from the latest weekly 8‑K's "assumed diluted shares outstanding" line.
Same Bitcoin, three ways to value the obligation
The asset side is identical in all three frameworks: $55.4B of Bitcoin on the books. No dispute about what's there. The three numbers differ in which question they answer.
Method 1 is the asset-side ceiling
Strategy's published “BTC NAV per assumed-diluted-share” is total BTC value divided by the diluted share count, with no deduction for senior claims. The diluted count is mostly common — it includes treasury-method dilution from options and RSUs, plus if-converted dilution from convertible notes and from STRK (which IS convertible into common) — but it does NOT count the non-convertible STRF/STRD/STRC/STRE preferred shares, because those don't convert. So the result is essentially “BTC value per common-equivalent share, ignoring senior obligations.”
That's a useful number. It's the ceiling — what each common share would be worth if the preferred and convert-debt claims didn't exist. Strategy uses it as a benchmark vs MSTR's market price: when market < BTC NAV per share, the wrapper is trading at a discount; when market > BTC NAV, it's at a premium. But it deliberately doesn't answer “what's the residual claim per share after senior obligations get paid.” For that, you need Methods 2 or 3.
Method 2 is the conservative residual floor
Subtract the pref claim at the worst-case figure — the $100/share liquidation preference — from the BTC value, subtract the convertible debt at face, divide by diluted shares. This is the framing a traditional credit analyst uses: assume the senior security gets paid in full, the residual is what's left for common. It over-deducts on the preferred side: Strategy never has to actually pay out $100/share, because the preferreds are perpetual and never mature. The $100 par is a ceiling on what they'd owe in liquidation, not the present value of their actual cash-flow obligation.
Method 3 deducts the preferred claim at its real economic value
The whole site is built on one idea: every preferred is a fixed dividend stream
backed by a finite BTC stack, and the geometric series of BTC sold to fund that
stream converges to a specific number — not unbounded. The cadence-aware closed
form is (D · par / k) / ((1+CAGR)^(1/k) − 1)
per share, where k is the payment frequency (4 for the quarterly prefs,
12 for STRC monthly). That number is the dollar value of Strategy's actual obligation
to its pref holders.
For a 10% quarterly perpetual at CAGR=30%, the PV of the dividend stream is about $37 per share (37% of par) — meaning Strategy's real economic liability per pref share is closer to $37 than $100. Subtracting the true PV instead of par gives a bigger residual to common than Method 2, but still less than the Method 1 ceiling (because senior claims are real, even if smaller than par implies). Method 3 is the framework most aligned with the rest of the site's analysis.
What the spread tells you
All three numbers are illustrative and assumption-loaded. They sit in the order Method 2 ($106) < Method 3 ($119) < Method 1 ($145) because each one deducts a different amount of senior claim. The site's framework (Method 3) lands closer to the ceiling than the conservative floor — which is the substantive claim: treating preferreds at par over-deducts; treating them at PV of dividends gets closer to the truth.
The Method 1 vs Method 3 spread of -17.6% is how much per-share value you give up by demanding senior claims be paid out (at PV) before common gets anything — at CAGR=30%. If BTC growth disappoints and you slide G down to 15%, the PV of the pref divs grows substantially, Method 3 moves toward Method 2, and the residual to common shrinks. The BTC-cost page walks through that sensitivity.
What this page deliberately doesn't model
Conversion of STRK and the convertible notes is not modeled here. STRK is convertible into MSTR common stock at a fixed strike; if MSTR rallies enough, STRK holders convert and the diluted-common count grows. Likewise, several of Strategy's outstanding convertible notes have strikes that are out-of-the-money at today's MSTR price but would convert if MSTR rallies sufficiently before maturity. All three methods above use the diluted-share count from the most recent 8‑K, which already reflects ITM converts under Strategy's own assumed-diluted treatment, but doesn't try to model what happens if more converts go ITM in the future.
The honest version of that question — “at what MSTR price does the diluted count grow by N%, and how does that re-rate per-share value?” — is a sensitivity analysis worth doing. It's a follow-up; this page focuses on the three-way comparison at today's snapshot.
CAGR = 30% is an assumption, not a forecast. Method 3's number depends on it. If BTC CAGR disappoints, the PV of pref divs grows toward (and past) the par notional, and Method 3's advantage over Method 2 shrinks or inverts. The disclosures page spells out why we use CAGR=30% as the default and why the per-tranche pages let you slide it.
Convertible-debt principal is a manually-curated aggregate. The $8.20B figure is sourced from Strategy's most recent 10‑K as of December 31, 2025. We then net out $1.50B of convertible principal repurchased after that date — recorded in the Transaction Accretion Ledger — leaving $6.70B subtracted here, so the ledger and this valuation agree. We don't model individual convert tranches (different maturities, different strikes, different coupons) here — for the per-common math the aggregate is sufficient, since all converts are senior to common regardless of issue. A future page could decompose the convert stack and model conversion-vs-cash-repayment per issue.
Forward yield reframes Method 1
The three methods above all snapshot today's BTC stack. But MSTR's BTC-per-share
grows over time through accretive ATM issuance — Strategy publishes that
growth as BTC Yield %. If you
believe Y for N years, then Method 1's $145 anchor
multiplies by (1 + Y)^N. Sample cells:
| Y ↓ / N → | 1 yr | 5 yr | 10 yr |
|---|---|---|---|
| 15% |
1.15× $166 |
2.01× $291 |
4.05× $586 |
| 25% |
1.25× $181 |
3.05× $442 |
9.31× $1,348 |
| 40% |
1.40× $203 |
5.38× $779 |
28.93× $4,188 |
The full forward-yield argument — including the feedback-loop diagram, the bistability analysis, and an interactive slider over the full (Y, N) space — is on the mNAV page →. Read it next.